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RESTATING THE OBVIOUS IN MARYLAND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW: THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS liABIUTY AND FAILURE TO
WARN DEFENSES
Rebecca Korzect
I.

INTRODUCTION

Products liability doctrine has struggled to balance the competing
interests of product safety with those of product development and innovation. I Manufacturer defenses are at the center of the dynamic
and controversial debates in contemporary products liability law. 2 An
increasingly important inquiry centers on the availability of defenses
in failure-ta-warn cases. 3 These defenses include the bulk supplier,
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1. See generally John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory
and Administration of Strict Liahility for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803

(1976).

2. See generally John Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the
Calabresian Approach to Products Liahility, 74 VA. L. REv. 677 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1206-57 (1994) (discussing reasons why consumers fail to read, comprehend, remember or follow even "good"
warnings). Professor Latin argues that defective warning analysis "raises, in
perhaps its most striking form, the fundamental question whether manufacturers or consumers should bear the primary responsibility for accident
prevention in product-use settings." [d. at 1197. For an interesting critique
of Professor Latin's article, see Kenneth Ian Weissman, A "Comment]" Parry
to Howard Latin s "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 70
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 629 (1996). See also 2 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, Reporter's Study: Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury-Approaches
to Legal and Institutional Change 66 (1991) [hereinafter "ALI Reporter's
Study"] ("Not only is complete safety unachievable, but it is inconsistent
with a serious interest in warning issues. This interest presupposes a commitment to individual autonomy-within limits, to letting informed people
decide for themselves what products to buy and how to use products.").
American products liability traditionally defines three types of defects: manufacturing defects, design defects and marketing defects (failure to warn).
See, e.g., David Fischer, Product Liahility-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L.

REv. 339 (1974).
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learned intermediary, and sophisticated user defenses,4 and flow from
the obvious danger rule-the concept being that the duty to warn
does not extend to known, patent or obvious dangers. 5
Typically, these defenses are available in cases involving the sale of
goods to knowledgeable consumers or other sophisticated buyers,
such as other manufacturers. 6 As a member of the same trade or industry as the ultimate product user, the manufacturer appreciates the
dangerous characteristics of its product. 7 Nevertheless, the manufacturer does not have a duty to warn the ultimate product users because
these users already possess actual or constructive knowledge of the
product's dangers. 8 For example, an industrial customer may
4. Some courts reject the sophisticated user, learned intermediary and bulk
supplier doctrines. See, e.g., Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238,
252-54 (3d Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply the bulk supplier doctrine); Hall v.
Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515, 1519-21 (D. Conn. 1986) (refusing to
apply the learned intermediary doctrine to employer-employee relationships). Still other courts hold that whether manufacturers should directly
warn ultimate users is a factual question. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller, 981
F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying Vermont law to hold that a glue
manufacturer had a duty to warn book bindery employees directly of dangers of prolonged inhalation of glue vapor); Bryant v. Technical Research
Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1348 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that bulk suppliers
should obtain their distributor's customer list to provide direct warnings).
5. SeeJonescue v.Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 306 N.E.2d 312, 316 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1973) ("[T]he purpose of a warning is to apprise a party of a danger of
which he is not aware, and thus enable him to protect himself against it.");
see also Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543-44, 332 A2d 11, 15 (1975).
A related concern in warnings cases is that "excessive warnings on product
labels may be counterproductive, causing 'sensory overload' that literally
drowns crucial information in a sea of mind-numbing detail." Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 509 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993). See generally AD. Twerski et aI., The Use and Abuse of Warning in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495,
514-16 (1976).
6. See Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1058-62 (D. Md.
1975) (holding that bulk supplier/sophisticated user defense applied when
the manufacturer was DuPont, a knowledgeable industrial purchaser); see
also Hall, 625 F. Supp. at 1516 (noting that the defendant raised knowledgeable user exception in a situation involving an industrial customer); Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552,561 (W.D. Va. 1984) (ruling that
under Virginia law, suppliers of silica-containing products did not have a
duty to advise employees of dangers when the purchaser-employer clearly
knew of the dangers).
7. See generally R. Robert Stomrol & Dina M. Cox, Recent Developments in the
Indiana Law of Product Liability, 32 IND. L. REv. 927, 938-42 (1999) (commenting that a manufacturer has no duty to warn the ultimate consumer if
the manufacturer can apply the sophisticated user doctrine); Mark M. Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant
Consensus on Warning Law is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1125, 1160-61 (1994)
(criticizing the sophisticated user doctrine for creating problems of fairness, efficiency, and justice).
8. See Kennedy v. Mobay, 84 Md. App. 397,427,579 A2d 1191, 1206 (1990);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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purchase the producing manufacturer's product for use in its own
manufacturing process. Although aware of the product's dangers, this
industrial buyer may, nevertheless, supply the product to its employees without warning them. If the product subsequently injures an employee, that employee frequently will sue both his employer9 and the
producing manufacturer. Consequently, the producing manufacturer
or seller will likely defend the user's products liability claim on one of
two theories. First, no obligation to warn exists because the injured
employee already understood the product's hazards without the necessity of a seller warning or instruction. lO In the alternative, the original seller may argue that any duty to warn rested with an intervening
seller or the employer itself. 11
In such situations, the learned intermediary, bulk supplier and sophisticated user doctrines provide the manufacturer with a defense in
products liability failure-to-warn cases. Fundamentally, these doctrines are premised on basic products liability no-duty rules-manufacturers have no duty to warn professional users and their employees
of product risks because these users already comprehend the product
risks. 12 Thus, the initial inquiry is whether the purchaser is a sophisticated user or learned intermediary, thereby obviating the duty to
warn.
While embracing the generally accepted doctrine that a product
user should be warned of latent defects and dangers, the obvious danger rule is premised upon the idea that it would be wasteful to provide
instructions or warnings already known by the product user. 13 The
obvious danger rule has further support from the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)"):
In general, a product seller is not subject to liability for failing to warn or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance
measures should be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users. When a risk is obvious or generally
9. The suit against the employer is a worker's compensation action, offering
limited monetary recovery. See, e.g., C & K Lord, Inc. v. Carter, 74 Md. App.
68,74-75,536 A.2d 669, 702 (1988).
10. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
12. See Bartkewich v. Billinger, 247 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1968) (stating "we hardly
believe it is anymore necessary to tell an experienced factory worker that he
should not put his hand into a machine that is at that moment breaking
glass than it would be necessary to tell a zookeeper to keep his head out of
a hippopotamus' mouth"). But see Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
485 A.2d 305, 311 (NJ. 1984) (stating that an experienced mechanic
should be reminded of tire rim mismatch dangers although he had already
experienced a similar injury).
13. See Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: The Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv.
761, 768 (1998); see also infra Part III.A. See generally MARsHALL S. SHAPO,
THE LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABIUTI §§ 19.01-19.14 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp.
1997).
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known, the prospective addressee of a warning will or should
already know of its existence. Warning of obvious or generally known risk in most instances will not provide an effective
additional measure of safety. Furthermore, warnings that
deal with obvious or generally known risks may be ignored by
users and consumers and may diminish the significance of
warnings about non-obvious, not-generally-known risks.
Thus requiring warnings of obvious or generally known risks
could reduce the efficacy of warnings generally.14
American products liability law does not recognize a duty to warn of
obvious dangers. Because the purpose of warnings is to reduce product risks, Professors Henderson and Twerski, the Reporters to the Restatement (Third), have called the "no duty to warn of obvious danger"
rule "beyond reproach."15 If reasonable persons differ on the question of the obviousness of the danger, the issue is for the trier of
fact.16 The Restatement (Third) supports this positionP
The bulk supplier, learned intermediary, and sophisticated user defenses raise central issues about the nature and purpose of product
warnings. When judges and lawyers treat these defenses as one doctrine, failing to distinguish differences in them, difficulties arise. Consolidating these defenses obscures the significant distinctions between
the doctrines because they present completely distinct factual settings.
In the case of the bulk supplier and learned intermediary defenses,
the duty to instruct or to warn is delegated to an equally knowledgeable, but more directly positioned, warning party. In the case of the
sophisticated user defense, no duty to warn exists because the user
already appreciates the product dangers.
Significant policy considerations may exist for permitting the manufacturer to fulfill its warning obligations by providing information to
its immediate vendee rather than directly to the ultimate user. These
rationales, however, deserve cogent and thoughtful articulation.
More importantly, as a defense, the doctrine must be clearly distinguished from the plaintiff's initial obligation to prove a defect. The
first setting deals with the delegability of a manufacturer's duty to
warn. As such, the doctrine actually provides a defense. The sophisticated user doctrine, however, implicates the more basic issue of the
very existence of a product defect. As a result, this Article argues that
this doctrine should not be viewed as a defense at all. Simply stated,
the sophisticated user already knows the product danger, obviating
14.
15.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

§ 2 cmt. j.

JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. AND AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILI1Y:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 344 (4th ed. 2000).

16. See, e.g., Stanley v. Aeroquip Corp., 181 F.3d 103 (6th Cir. 1999).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt.j ("When reasonable minds may differ as to
whether the risk was obvious, or generally known, the issue is to be decided
by the trier of fact.").

2001]

Failure to Warn Defenses in Maryland Law

345

the necessity of a manufacturer warning. These doctrines seem to indicate that the product is not defective for lack of a warning to the
ultimate product user. Nevertheless, it is common to refer to these
doctrines as the learned intermediary, bulk seller, or sophisticated
user "defenses." Because user knowledge goes to the heart of proving
product defect, it should be part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. IS
The promulgation of the Restatement (Thirdl 9 mandates a reexamination of basic products liability issues. For example, courts applying
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second),,),
have questioned the validity of these defenses in strict liability, as opposed to negligence-based, failure-to-warn cases. 20 Analyzing these issues permits a better understanding of whether the Restatement (Third)
improves or clarifies the current standard.
The related defenses of the bulk supplier, the sophisticated user
and the learned intermediary form the topic of discussion in this Article because these doctrines cast the competing rights and duties of
product manufacturers, health-care providers, and product users in
sharp contrast. The issuance by the American Law Institute (ALI) of a
Restatement of Products Liability offers an ideal opportunity to reexamine Maryland products liability doctrine.
This Article will examine these warning doctrines from several perspectives. Part II presents a historical overview of these issues. 21 Part
III examines Maryland law on the duty to warn. 22 Part IV discusses the
Restatement (Second)'s adoption of the sophisticated user defense. 23 Finally, Part V evaluates the Restatement (Third)'s contribution to these
failure-to-warn or informational defenses. 24
II.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The general rule in products liability law is that the product seller
must provide the ultimate user all necessary warnings and instructions
to prevent the product from being defectively dangerous. 25 Failure to
warn may be based on either negligence or strict liability.26 Under
either theory, the product seller or manufacturer must warn the ultimate user of product dangers that can cause foreseeable harm. 27
18. See generally supra notes 8, 10, 12-13 and accompanying text.
19. See AAJJ Wraps Up Products Liability Project, New UCC Article on Licenses Makes
Debut, 65 U.S.L.w. 2777, June 3, 1997.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.C.
25. See DeChello v. Johnson Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207
(1988); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1984).
26. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 682 A.2d 1143
(1996).
27. See Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975).
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Generally, the duty to warn requires the seller to have actual or constructive knowledge of the product hazards. 28 If the product user also
has actual knowledge of such product dangers, the seller has no duty
to warn. 29

A.

Duty to Warn in Negligence Actions

Any discussion of these defenses must begin with the landmark case
of Littlehale v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours CO.,30 a products liability sophisticated user action brought in negligence rather than in strict liability.
In Littlehale, the district court concluded that "there need be no warning to one in a particular trade or profession against a danger generally known to that trade or profession."31 Consequently, absent a duty
to warn the product purchaser, there is no duty to warn an employee
of that purchaser. 32 The Littlehale court based its decision on the language found in comment k to Restatement (Second) section 388, which
provides that a manufacturer has no duty to warn product users of
dangers if the manufacturer has reason to expect that such product
users will discover and comprehend the dangers. 33 In other words, no
28. See Dudley v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 98 Md. App. 182, 198, 632 A.2d

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

492,500 (1993).
See generally Latin, supra note 3.
268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
[d. at 798.
[d. at 799.
Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)"), entitled "Chattel Known to Be Dangerous for Intended Use," provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the
use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or had reason to know that the chattel is or is likely
to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)"]; see also Lockett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (discussing section 388). Section 402A of the Restatement (Second),
entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer," provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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duty to warn exists where any potential product dangers are obvious
or patent.

B.

Distinguishing Negligence-Based and Strict Liability-Based Failure-toWarn Actions

Failure-to-warn cases, like manufacturing and design defect actions,
usually include claims sounding both in negligence and strict liability.34 Courts continue, however, to debate the question of whether
any significant distinction exists between negligence-based and strict
liability-based duty to warn actions. 35 Although some courts conclude
that a m;l.llufacturer's duty to warn under section 402A of the Restatement (SecondJ6 is separate and distinct from its duty to warn under a
negligence theory,37 most jurisdictions maintain that a manufacturer's
duty to warn under either section 388 negligence or section 402A
strict liability analysis is substantially identica1. 38 These jurisdictions
analyze failure-to-warn cases in terms of "reasonableness," a negligence concept. 39

34.

35.

36.
37.

38.
39.

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it was
sold;
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A.
Warranty claims may also be available. See, e.g., DeChello v. Johnson Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207 (1988) (quoting Hayes v.
Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277, em. denied, 312 Md. 601,
541 A.2d 964 (1988) ("if foreseeable users are not adequately warned of
dangers associated with its use" the product is not merchantable)).
See Battersby v. Boyer, 526 S.E.2d 159, 162 (Ga. App. 1999) (distinguishing
between negligent failure to warn and strict liability); Ragin v. Porter Hayden Co., 133 Md. App. 116, 154,706 A.2d 503, 524 (2000) (remanding case
to determine "whether the continuing duty to warn was included as part of
the negligence or strict liability claim"); Mazda v. Ragowski, 105 Md. App.
318,325,659 A.2d 391, 394 (1995) (rejecting Mazda's argument that "there
is no difference between a claim of negligence and a claim of strict liability
in tort based on failure to warn"); O'Flynn v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 759
So. 2d 526, 534 (Miss. 2000) ("Mississippi strict liability followed a negligence based approach after adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A.").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A.
See, e.g., Higgins v. E.I. DuPont Nemours, 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (D. Md.
1975) (discussing W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 49, at 697 (5th ed. 1984)). For a recent case offering an interesting discussion of the distinction between the implied warranty of merchantability
and strict liability in tort see Denny v. Fard Motar Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 734-36
(N.Y. 1995).
See, e.g., Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 373 N.Y.S.2d 928, 931 (1975).
Id.
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Analysis of these doctrinal issues must consider whether differences
exist between the Restatement (Second)'s negligence and strict liability
provisions. As defined by section 388, a manufacturer is liable to an
injured product user when "the manufacturer knew or in the exercise
of ordinary care should have known" of the potential hazards. 40 By
contrast, section 402A provides that a manufacturer is strictly liable
for selling a product "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" even though the seller has exercised all
possible reasonable careY Comment j of section 402A states that a
seller may prevent a product from being unreasonably dangerous by
providing directions or warnings. 42 At the same time, commentj also
suggests that the manufacturer has a duty to warn only if the manufacturer could reasonably foresee the product's danger. 43
Because the language of commentj uses the term "reasonably,"44 a
term that connotes negligence, questions arise as to whether actual
substantive differences exist between a manufacturer's duty to warn
under section 388 as opposed to section 402A. In addition, there remains substantial disagreement about whether foreseeability, a negligence requirement,45 is an element in a strict liability duty to warn
case. Many courts have concluded that the two forms of action are
essentially identical, in the sense that both are negligence-based. Distinctions exist, however, in the limited availability of strict liability
defenses. 46
C.

Determining Manufacturer Liability

Courts employ a variety of approaches in determining manufacturer liability for failure to warn ultimate users of product dangers.
These approaches include: the bright-line duty, reasonableness test
doctrine and the product-oriented approach.

§ 388.
[d. § 402A.
[d. § 402A cmt. j.
[d.
[d.
Cedar Falls v. Cedar Falls Cmty. School Dist., 617 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Iowa
2000) (stating that the foreseeability of the harm flowing from the actor's
conduct is used to determine the cause-in-fact component of negligence);
Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 143-44, 753 A.2d 41, 64 (2000) (discussing the importance of foreseeability in terms of negligence); Lopez v.
Three Rivers Elec. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Mo. 2000) (stating that foreseeability is used to determine if a duty exists).
46. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1980), eert. denied,
449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 486A.2d 712, 721-22
& n.9 (D.C. 1985).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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Bright-Line Duty

Some courts apply the "bright-line duty" test under which a seller
has no duty to warn the ultimate user when intermediate purchasers
are knowledgeable of the product's dangers. 47 In many respects this
approach to the sophisticated user defense is based on a self-evident
tort proposition: without a duty, there can be no breach and therefore, no liability.48 Clearly, this approach focuses on the intermediary's knowledge, rather than on the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct. 49

2.

Reasonableness Test

Other courts focus more attention on the factors in comment n,50
testing the reasonableness of the manufacturer's reliance on the intermediate purchaser as a conduit of product safety information. 51 If,
after weighing these factors, it appears that the manufacturer reasonably relied on a knowledgeable intermediate purchaser to convey product safety information to ultimate users, these courts conclude that
there is no duty to directly warn ultimate users. 52 Undisputed facts
concerning the ultimate purchaser'S actual or constructive knowledge
47. See Acoba v. Gen. Tire Corp., 986 P.2d 288, 296 (Haw. 1999) (holding that
Arenato Romero was an experienced tire repairman and, in the absence of
any evidence to show that he was not knowledgeable of the dangers in the
repair and with regard to multi-piece rims, the defendant did not have a
duty to warn); Steinbarth v. Otis Elevator Co., 703 N.Y.S.2d 417, 417 (N.Y.
2000) (stating that defendant has no duty to warn a knowledgeable user).
But see Kennedy v. Mobay, 84 Md. App. 397, 413, 579 A.2d 1191, 1199
(1990) (adopting a case-by-case approach instead of the bright-line rule).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 4; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984).
49. Cook v. Branick Mfg., Inc., 736 F.2d 1442, 1446 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating
that the duty to warn "is discharged by informing the employer of the dangerous condition," and warning each of the employees "then becomes the
responsibility of the employer"); Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 693 F.2d 426, 43031 (5th Cir. 1982); Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882,886-87 (4th
Cir. 1980) (manufacturer of brewing equipment had no duty to warn brewery employee of hazards in the use of the equipment where those hazards
were open and obvious to the employer-brewery); Younger v. Dow Corning
Corp., 451 P.2d 177, 184 (Kan. 1969) (chemical supplier that warned intermediate purchaser of toxic effects of chemical used in purchaser's manufacturing process had no duty to convey a direct warning to purchaser's
employee).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 388 cmt. n. See also infra notes 168-69 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the factors found in comment n.
51. See O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Kennedy, 84 Md. App. 397, 579 A.2d 1191); Goodbar v Whitehead Bros., 591 F.
Supp. 552, 557 (W.D. Va. 1984) (stating that one of the factors that needs
to be considered is the reliability of a third party as a conduit of necessary
information about the product); Kennedy, 84 Md. App. at 405,579 A.2d at
11 95 (citing Goodbar).
52. See O'Neal, 10 F.3d at 251; Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 557; Kennedy, 84 Md.
App. at 405, 579 A.2d at 1195.
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allow courts to resolve these issues as a matter of law. 53 Focusing on
the reasonableness of manufacturer conduct in warning users of product dangers blurs the distinction between negligence and strict liability theories in failure-to-warn litigation. 54
3.

Product-Oriented Approach

Courts that distinguish between the section 388 negligence approach and the section 402A strict liability approach in failure-to-warn
cases highlight the product-oriented approach of strict liability. 55
These courts emphasize that strict liability premises its analysis on the
condition of the product sold without adequate warnings, rather than
on manufacturer conduct. 56 This strict liability emphasis on the product as opposed to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct
demonstrates the basic distinction between strict liability and negligence. 57 From a strict liability viewpoint, manufacturer conduct is
simply irrelevant. The real inquiry is whether the product is in a defective condition because it lacks adequate warnings and
instructions. 58
This debate between negligence and strict liability in failure-to-warn
cases is part of the continuing need to reconcile competing, legitimate concerns in products liability theory-the consumer's interest in
product safety and the manufacturer's need for certainty, stability and
efficiency. Courts that find no significant distinction between negligent failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn tip the scales in
favor of the manufacturer's interests. In contrast, courts that distinguish between negligence and strict liability arguably elevate the public interest in product safety above marketplace innovation and
efficiency. Clearly, the Restatement (Third) states that failure-to-warn
cases sound in negligence. 59
53. See Davis v. Avondale Indus., 975 F.2d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 1992); Manning v.
Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1983); Hopkins v. Chip-in-Saw,
Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1980); Sara Lee Corp. v. Homasote Co.,
719 F. Supp. 417, 424 (D. Md. 1989).
54. See, e.g., Davis, 975 F.2d at 172 (applying Louisiana law, specifically, LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57 (West 1991)).
55. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980).
56. [d. (stating that the distinction between negligence and strict liability disappears when an unavoidably dangerous product is involved).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third))
adopts a reasonableness or negligence standard in warning cases. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(c). A product is considered defective "because of inadequate warnings or instruction if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller . . . and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe." [d.
Therefore, the warning or instruction must alert product users of product
risks and inform them of safe product use. [d. § 2(c) cmt. i. The adequacy
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Manufacturer Defenses in Failure-tcrwarn Actions

In general, the seller must warn ultimate product users of product
risks. In some settings, however, the seller may rely on the buyer to
provide a warning. 60 Therefore, the seller either has no duty to warn
or the seller can discharge its warning duty by relying on the buyer to
warn the ultimate user. Courts have struggled to define whether this
presents a legal issue for the court as to the existence of the duty, or a
factual question for the trier of fact as to the breach of that duty.61
1.

Sophisticated User Defense

The sophistication and actual knowledge of anticipated product
users may obviate the duty to warn. For example, the manufacturer of
a connector plug is under no duty to warn electricians of the hazards
associated with such plugs. 62 Similarly, a circuit breaker supplier has
no duty to warn a communications company of the dangers of failing
to test a switchboard before reactivating it after a flood. 63 Additionally, a gunpowder manufacturer has no duty to warn buyers that the
risk of fire decreases if the powder is stored in a boxed container. 64

2.

Bulk Supplier Defense

The bulk supplier defense rests more on concerns of feasibility than
knowledge. 65 Normally, the bulk supplier of a chemical product or
fluid has no practical way of physically attaching a warning to its product in a manner that will actually reach the ultimate user. 66 As a result, such a supplier must rely on the knowledgeable intermediary
purchaser to warn the user.67 For example, a supplier selling dielectric fluids containing PCBs to an electrical transformer manufacturer
has no duty to warn the buyer's employees of the risks associated with
fluid handling when the fluids were delivered in bulk to a manufacturer /buyer aware of these product risks. 68 On the other hand, when

60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.

67.
68.

of product warnings is tested under a reasonableness standard which assesses the advantages and disadvantages of the warning actually given and
other reasonable alternative warnings which might have been given. Id.
§ 2(c) cmt. a.
See Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552,566 (W.D. Va. 1984).
See, e.g., Byrd v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).
Bigness v. Powell Elecs., Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (App. Div. 1994).
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 625 N'y.S.2d 121, 123-24 (N.Y.
1995).
Hines v. Remington Arms Co., 648 So. 2d 331, 336-37 (La. 1994).
See O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 1993).
Id. (quoting Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179,219,604 A.2d
445, 464 (1992».
See, e.g., Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383,1394 (Kan. 1976).
Fisher v. Monsanto Co., 863 F. Supp. 285, 287 (W.D. Va. 1994); see also
Newson v. Monsanto Co., 869 F. Supp. 1255, 1262-63 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(supplier of chemical used in manufacturing windshields entitled to rely on
automobile manufacturer, as sophisticated purchaser, to warn its employ-
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the bulk seller of fabric for protective clothing retains control over
garment labeling, the seller cannot rely on the buyer/garment manufacturer to warn ultimate consumers.69 In determining the validity of
the bulk supplier defense, courts typically focus on facts and circumstances establishing which party is in the superior position to warn of
product dangers. 7o

3.

Learned Intermediary Defense

The rule that a learned or sophisticated intermediary enjoys the
better position to communicate warnings to the ultimate user first developed in prescription drug cases. 71 More recent cases have recognized limitations on the doctrine. For example, in Nichols v. McNeilab,
Inc.,72 a case involving the withdrawal of a prescription drug from the
marketplace, the court rejected the manufacturer's learned intermediary defense. 73 The Nichols court reasoned that, because the drug
was prescribed for intermittent use, patients might not receive actual
notice from their physicians in situations involving gaps in medical
treatment. 74 Many of the more recent cases arise in the workplace. 75
The trend is to require a warning only to the buyer/employer if that
employer has the actual or constructive knowledge necessary to comprehend the product dangers. 76
E.

Application of the Manufacturer Defenses

Cogent application of the manufacturer defenses involves a two-pronged analysis. 77 The first prong considers whether the sophisticated
purchaser/bulk supplier defense is available, thus permitting satisfaction of the seller's duty to warn by warning the intermediate purchaser?78 If the defense is available, the second prong considers the

69.
70.

71.
72.

73.
74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

ees of risks of chemical exposure); Jodway v. Kennametal, Inc., 525 N.W.2d
883,886 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (bulk purchaser of cobalt was "sophisticated
user," so that supplier could avail itself of "sophisticated user" defense).
Carter v. E.1. DuPont de Nemours, 456 S.E.2d 661,664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
See, e.g., Sara Lee v. Homasote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417 (D. Md. 1989); see also
infra note 153 and accompanying text.
See Dyer v. Danck Med., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (Tex. 2000); Whitehead v. Dycho Co., 775 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1989).
850 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
/d. at 563.
Id. at 564-65.
See Scallan v. Duriron Co., 11 F.3d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1994) (analyzing
Louisiana law); O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 252-54 (4th Cir.
1993) (applying Maryland law). Cf Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 627 A.2d 1347,
1360 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (analyzing Connecticut's Product Liability Statute which states user's sophistication is a factor to be considered by the trier
of fact in determining warning adequacy).
See, e.g., O'Neal, 10 F.3d at 252-54; Scallan, 11 F.3d at 1252.
In re Asbestos Litig., 542 A.2d 1205, 1212-13 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
Id. at 1212.
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adequacy of the warning. 79 This two-prong analysis was recently applied in Baker v. Monsanto,80 an action brought by Westinghouse employees, whose work responsibilities included repairing transformers.
These employees claimed that the repair work exposed them to PCBs
manufactured by Monsanto and sold to Westinghouse for use as a
transformer lubricant. 81 Monsanto defended by arguing that Westinghouse, as a sophisticated purchaser, was fully aware of PCB hazards. 82
Although the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana concluded that Indiana would adopt the "knowledgeable, sophisticated bulk purchaser" doctrine, it held as a matter of law that
Monsanto adequately had warned Westinghouse because Westinghouse, as a self-described expert on PCBs, had extensive, independent
knowledge of the dangers of PCB exposure. 83
III.

THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE

Under Maryland law, a manufacturer has two obligations in a failure-to-warn case: (1) a duty to communicate an adequate warning of
the dangers involved in the use of the product; and (2) a duty to provide adequate instructions for product use to avoid product dangers. 84
Under general negligence theory, a manufacturer will be held liable for failing to warn or failing to warn adequately.85 In strict liability, a product will be found defective if it is unreasonably dangerous
without adequate warnings. 86 Under either approach, the primary issue is whether the manufacturer's warning is adequate under the totality of the circumstances. 87 Nonetheless, in Maryland, the analysis
applied under either negligence or strict liability is actually the negligence-based analysis found in section 388 of the Restatement (Second).88
The starting point in Maryland for failure-to-warn doctrine is Moran
v. Faberge CO. 89 In Moran, the Court of Appeals of Maryland designated section 388 as the foundation for failure-to-warn analysis. 90 The
court held that a manufacturer's duty to produce a safe product, accompanied by appropriate warnings and instructions if necessary, is
indistinguishable from the general responsibility of every person to
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1213.
962 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1159-60.
Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 493,158 A.2d 110, 119 (1960).
See generally 1 Madden & Owen on Products Liability § 2:4 (3d ed. 2000).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 96, at 685.
Twombley, 221 Md. at 493, 158 A.2d at 119.
See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848,858 (4th Cir. 1980).
273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
Id. at 544-45, 332 A.2d at 15-16.
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exercise due care in order to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to
others. 91
Both comment n to section 388 and practical considerations support Maryland case law in recognizing situations where it is either impracticable or unnecessary for manufacturers to warn ultimate users.92
First, intermediate purchasers who supply the product to ultimate
users may be as knowledgeable about the nature and extent of product dangers as the initial supplier. 93 Second, the product may be supplied in bulk to the intermediate purchaser who ultimately repackages or re-Iabels it. 94 In these situations, the manufacturer is in
no position to warn or to instruct ultimate product users.

A.

Obvious Danger in Maryland

1.

Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp.

Maryland courts have consistently held that only latent product dangers, not patent product dangers, will trigger the warning requirements. 95 In Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp.,96 a worker was injured
by concrete after the manufacturer had failed to warn of product dangers. The court concluded as a matter of law that "it would be as
unreasonable to require every supplier of concrete to warn of its caustic properties, as to require an electric company to warn of the danger
of touching uninsulated wires."97
91. Id. at 543, 332 A.2d at 15; see also Twombley, 221 Md. at 476, 158 A.2d at 110;

Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 388 cmt. n.
93. Eagle-Picher Indust. Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 61, 578 A.2d 228, 253
(1990).
94. Id. at 62,578 A.2d at 253 (quoting Higgins v. E.1. DuPont Nemours, 671 F.
Supp. 1055, 1062 (D. Md. 1987».
95. See generally Volkswagen of Am. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219-20, 321 A.2d
737, 74tH:7 (1974) (holding that an automobile manufacturer is liable for a
design defect that it could have reasonably foreseen would cause or enhance injuries in a collision, which is neither patent nor obvious to the
user, and which actually leads to or enhances the injuries sustained by the
user in an automobile accident); Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md.
364, 368-69, 283 A.2d 567, 569-70 (1971) (holding that since injured plaintiff was familiar with the dangers of a paper bailing machine, defendantmanufacturer's failure to provide proper guards was patent rather than latent, and therefore barred recovery); Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co.,
255 Md. 241, 24M7, 257 A.2d 430,432-33 (1969) (holding that while Maryland recognizes the latent-patent rule in negligence cases, a plaintiff must
be in privity to collect on a breach of warranty claim); Banks v. Iron Hustler
Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 423, 475 A.2d 1243, 1250 (1984) (holding that
patent dangers in a product bar the plaintiff from recovering on a theory of
negligence) .
96. 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1958).
97. Id. at 204, 151 A.2d at 733; see also Twombley, 221 Md. at 493-94, 158 A.2d at
119 (chemicals in a product could constitute a latent danger depending on
knowledge of the product uses); Iron Hustler, 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d
1243.
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Moran v. Faberge, Inc.

In Moran v. Faberge, Inc., the court opined that the "duty to produce
a safe product, with appropriate warnings and instructions when necessary is no different from the responsibility each of us bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others."98 Moran
measures the reasonableness of such risk by "balancing the probability
and seriousness of harm, if care is not exercised, against the costs of
taking appropriate precautions."99 As a general matter, Moran views
the costs of warning as so minimal that the balancing process nearly
always finds a duty to warn of latent dangers. 1OO
Determining the adequacy of warnings generally involves balancing
the following factors: (1) the dangerousness of the product; (2) the
manner of product use; (3) the manner and form of warnings; (4) the
burdens imposed by required warnings; and (5) the likelihood that
the particular warning will be communicated to foreseeable product
users.1OI The warning need only be reasonable, "not the best possible
warning."I02

3.

Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co.

Myers v. Montgomery Ward & CO.103 illustrates many of the problems
with the obvious danger rule. Myers involved injuries sustained by the
buyer of a lawnmower not equipped with safety devices. Io4 The court
assumed that if the consumer purchased a dangerous lawnmower with
an obvious defect, the lack of a safety device, the consumer must have
had adequate information with which to make a rational, reasonable
choice. Specifically the court of appeals noted that "the absence of
the safety devices was apparent at the time of purchase, and, in a free
market, Myers had the choice of buying a mower equipped with them,
of buying the mower which he did, or of buying no mower at all."lo5
There are basic deficiencies with this analysis. First, practically
speaking, the consumer will not necessarily have a choice between selecting a safe product over a dangerous one. For example, some
products, such as prescription drugs may be unavoidably dangerous.
Second, although the physical absence of a safety device on a lawnmower may be obvious, the extent of the danger created by the lack of
such a safety device may not be evident. Obtaining adequate safety
information may be impossible or too expensive for the average con98. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538,543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975).
99. [d.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

[d. at 543-44, 332 A.2d at 15.
[d. at 543-46, 332 A.2d at 15-16.
Levin v. Walter Kidde & Co., 251 Md. 560, 564, 248 A.2d 151, 154 (1968).
253 Md. 282,252 A.2d 855 (1969).
[d. at 285-86, 252 A.2d at 857-58.
[d. at 294, 297-98, 252 A.2d 862-64.
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sumer. 106 Moreover, even the consumer who perceives an abstract
danger, may underestimate the actual hazard to him.107 Further, the
dangerous product may harm not only the original buyer, but also
innocent bystanders who have no voice in making purchase
decisions. lOS
B.

Sophisticated Users and Bulk Suppliers

Guided by comment n to Restatement (Second) section 388, federal
courts, applying Maryland law, have recognized the sophisticated user,
learned intermediary and bulk supplier defenses. lo9 Significantly, federal courts applying Maryland law have looked beyond the apparent
differences in factual scenarios to recognize marketplace realities and
to resolve product defense issues as a matter of law. 11 0
Comment n affects both the "sophisticated user" and "bulk supplier" concepts. 111 These defenses are not distinct theories, each must
106. See generally Malcolm Gladwell, Dow Corning to Quit Silicone Breast-Implant
Business, WASH. POST, March 19, 1992, at AI, A12 (discussing Dow Corning's decision to discontinue the manufacture of breast implant devices in
the wake of inadequate scientific information on their safety and expensive
government tests which are being conducted to gather further data).
107. See generally Josh Sugarman, Safety; Troubleshooting Violence; Our Traumatized
City Can Be a Laboratory For New Solutions, WASH. POST, December 4,1994, at
C1-C3 (advocating the need to incorporate handguns into Washington,
D.C.'s products liability laws so that the federal government can oversee
that firearms are safe for their intended use and do not cause injury to their
users or innocent bystanders).
108. See Timothy D. Lytton, Note, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1247, 1249-54 (2000) (advocating
that the tort system can be reformed to better assist institutions such as
markets, legislatures, and administrative agencies in the making of public
policies designed to reduce handgun violence); Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
Note, Good Whisktry, Drunk Driving and Innocent Bystanders: The Responsibility of
Manufacturers of Alcohol and Other Dangerous Hedonic Products For Bystander
Injury, 45 S.C. L. REv. 269, 294-335 (1994) (advocating that courts or legislatures make manufacturers of alcohol and other dangerous products primarily designed for entertainment and enjoyment be subject to liability for
injuries caused to innocent bystanders).
109. See, e.g., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985); Singleton v.
Manitowac Co., 727 F. Supp. 217 (D. Md. 1989) (same); Sara Lee v. Homasote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417 (D. Md. 1989); Higgins v. E.1. DuPont Nemours,
671 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md. 1987); Goodbarv. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp.
552 (W.D. Va. 1984); Housand v. Bra-Con Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 541 (D.
Md. 1980).
1l0. See generally Singleton, 727 F. Supp. at 218 (using the sophisticated user defense in a suit involving a "blind spot" on a crane); Sara Lee, 719 F. Supp. at
419 (involving a fire in a pickle plant allegedly caused by products developed by defendant); Higgins, 671 F. Supp. at 1056-57 (using the sophisticated user defense in an action involving injuries and death arising from
spray paint); Housand, 751 F. Supp. at 541-42 (using the sophisticated user
defense in a suit involving a mechanical arm striking an assembly line
worker).
llI. See, e.g., Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
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be satisfied before a manufacturer may reasonably rely on a third
party to convey warnings or instructions to ultimate product users.
Rather, the "sophisticated user" and "bulk supplier" defenses constitute separate, yet complementary aspects of the same analysis-the
obligation of the initial seller to warn ultimate users when products
are supplied through a third-party intermediary. The "sophisticated
user" aspect of this inquiry focuses on intermediate purchaser knowledge,Il2 while the "bulk supplier" aspect focuses on the feasibility and
likelihood of manufacturer communications reaching the ultimate
user who receives the product through an intermediate industrial
purchaser. 113
1.

Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros.

A number of federal cases that have affected the development of
Maryland case law deserve special attention. 114 In Goodbar v. Whitehead
Bros.,115 foundry workers sued twelve suppliers of silica sand who provided the sand in unpackaged railroad car lots to plaintiffs' employer.
The suppliers were accused of "fail[ing] to advise the Foundry's employees with respect to the dangerous characteristics of silica products
and how to protect themselves from them," resulting in exposure to
silica and eventual silicosisY6
.
Mter determining that comment n was included in Virginia law,117
Judge Kiser reasoned that comment n "recognizes that a balancing of
these considerations is necessary in light of the fact that no single set
of rules could possibly be advanced that would cover all situations."IlB
Applying this rationale, Judge Kiser weighed the factors in comment
n, concluding that the sophisticated user defense is consistent with
the development of failure-to-warn case lawY9 As a result, he found
112. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indust., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445
(1992).
113. See Singleton, 727 F. Supp. at 225 (citing Sara Lee, 719 F. Supp. at 424).
114. See supra note 109-10 and accompanying text.
115. 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984).
116. Id. at 555.
117. Id. at 557 (citing Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184, 1188
(4th Cir. 1977)).
118. Id. It is likely that the outcome of Goodbar would have been the same if the
case had been brought under section 402A. The plaintiff-workers included
a claim for breach of implied warranty failure to warn. Id. at 555. Judge
Kiser stated that the duty to warn under a theory of implied warranty "focuses upon whether the lack of warning renders the product unreasonably
dangerous . . . . " Id. at 556. This is identical to the standard for strict
liability failure to warn. See Werner v. Vpjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.
1980). Judge Kiser granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
plaintiffs' warranty claim, finding that no implied warranty arises when the
intermediate purchaser receives the product with full knowledge of its dangerous condition. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 567.
119. Id. at 560-61.
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that the product supplier had no duty to warn employees of a knowledgeable industrial purchaser of product hazards. 120
Undisputed evidence demonstrating the foundry's extensive knowledge of the hazards of silica dust inhalation, including the danger of
developing silicosis, aided Judge Kiser in reaching this decision. 121
Significantly, the foundry was aware of proper dust control methods
for avoiding these dangers. 122 Moreover, the court found that information known in the industry since the 1930s should be imputed to
foundry officials active in industry groups that disseminated technical
information. 123 Direct evidence demonstrated that these foundry officials actually received information from industry groups, conducted
their own occupational health studies, and had "full comprehension ... of the dangers of high silica dust concentration and silicoSiS."124 The foundry had retained a local physician to monitor
employees exposed to silica dust and its management had actual
knowledge of government standards regulating permissible dust exposure levels. 125 The foundry's knowledge, obtained independently,
rather than through its product suppliers, formed the basis of Judge
Kiser's conclusion that the foundry completely appreciated the
hazards connected with silica dust exposure, including silicosis. 126
Judge Kiser recognized substantial impediments faced by suppliers
seeking to directly warn foundry employees of the silicosis danger: (1)
identification of users and others exposed to the products would require constant monitoring of the suppliers due to the constant turnover of the foundry's large work force; (2) sand products were
delivered to the foundry in bulk in un packaged railroad cars or trucks
lots; (3) written product warnings placed on the railroad cars or
trucks could not reach affected workers or bystanders because loose
sand was unloaded and stored in storage bins until used; (4) only the
foundry was in a position to provide the necessary housekeeping measures, training and warnings to its workers on a continuous and sys120. [d. at 559. (citing Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882 (4th Cir.
1980»; see also Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973);
Markerv. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957); Littlehale
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd,
380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
121. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 561-65.
122. [d.
123. [d. at 556.
124. [d. at 563.
125. [d. at 56465.
126. [d. The plaintiffs' experts in Goodbarcriticized the foundry's lack of proper
corrective measures and concluded that, because of this inaction, the foundry did not have the requisite sophistication. [d. at 565. Judge Kiser found
"this conclusion to be nothing short of amazing." [d. The plaintiffs' experts admitted that the foundry had information available about silica dust
exposure and silicosis. [d. Judge Kiser concluded that "since the Foundry
had such insight, Defendants could assume that proper use would be made
thereof." [d.
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tematic basis; (5) the suppliers were forced to rely on the foundry to
convey safety information to its employees; (6) confusion would result
from twelve different suppliers each providing competing, inconsistent information to foundry workers; and (7) given the commercial
setting, suppliers realistically could not exert pressure on a large, industrial customer to permit the suppliers access to the foundry to educate foundry workers about the hazards of silicosis. 127
Against this factual background, Judge Kiser concluded that no disputed material question of fact existed as to whether the suppliers
reasonably relied on the foundry to convey appropriate safety information to its workers. 128 As a result, he granted the suppliers' motions for summary judgment, holding on two grounds that they had
no duty to warn foundry employees: (1) the employer was a knowledgeable industrial purchaser; and (2) only the employer was directly
able to communicate effective warnings to the ultimate product
users.129
2.

Higgins v. E.!. Du Pont de Nemours & Co .

The Goodbar reasoning furnished the cornerstone of the decision in
Higgins v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours & CO. 130 In Higgins, the Baltimore
City Fire Department purchased Imron paint from DuPont, which
manufactured the paint using glycol ether acetates supplied by Eastman and Union Carbide. 131 Eventually, Baltimore City firefighters
brought a products liability action against DuPont, Kodak and Union
Carbide sounding in negligence, strict liability, and warranty, for failure to warn of possible teratogenic effects of Imron paint. 132
Judge Smalkin granted summary judgment in favor of Kodak and
Union Carbide, the bulk suppliers of chemicals to Du Pont, holding as
a matter of law that they had no duty to warn ultimate users, the
firefighters actually exposed to the chemicals in the paint. 133 The undisputed facts revealed a "plethora of material" evidencing Du Pont's
extensive knowledge concerning possible teratogenic effects of glycol
ether acetates. 134 The suppliers had obtained independent research
and information gathered from third parties, including its own suppliers. 135 DuPont's knowledge included technical studies conducted by
DuPont's own employees. These studies noted that high doses of the
127. Id. at 566 (citing Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 591 P.2d 478 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979»; Victor Schwartz & Robert Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need
For Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 38 (1983).
128. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 567.
129. Id. at 566-67.
130. 671 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md. 1987); see generally id. at 1058-59.
131. Id. at lO56.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1062-63.
134. Id. at 1056.
135. Id. at 1061.
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involved chemicals produced toxic effects on the reproductive and hematological systems of mice. 136 Moreover, DuPont received reports
prepared by Japanese researchers, by Dow Chemical and by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) discussing possible teratogenic effects. 137 Finally, Union Carbide and Kodak
had advised DuPont of research findings that animals experienced testicular changes and infertility from high chemical exposure.
The court held that DuPont was in a superior position than either
of the bulk suppliers to communicate effective warnings to ultimate
users because it manufactured, packaged, labeled and distributed the
finished product. 138 Thus, DuPont easily could have communicated
an effective warning to its customers. By comparison, Kodak and
Union Carbide were unable, as a practical matter, to communicate
any warning to the ultimate users because they supplied the chemicals
to DuPont in bulk. 139
In opposing summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that the sophisticated user and bulk supplier defenses were unavailable in strict
liability claims under section 402A. 140 Moreover, they insisted that the
adequacy of warnings is a factual question for the trier of fact, precluding summary judgment on the negligence claims. In the absence
of controlling Maryland decisions,Judge Smalkin followed Goodbar. 141
As previously discussed, Maryland courts developed a two-part analysis for the sophisticated user/bulk supplier defense. 142 The first
prong focuses on the status of the purchaser, DuPont, a chemical
company having sophisticated knowledge of chemicals. 143 As a dealer
in chemicals, DuPont presumably knew the risks and had no need for
product danger warnings. 144 The second prong involves the defendants' position as bulk suppliers of chemicals. 145 This prong addresses
the feasibility of providing warnings beyond DuPont, to end-users, because the product is not actually packaged until a later point in the
distribution process. 146 Generally, warnings are usually found to be
most effectively conveyed when placed directly on the product, its label or container. 147
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
/d.
Id. at 1061-62.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at lO62.
See supra notes lO9-11 and accompanying text.
See Higgins, 671 F. Supp. at lO62.
/d.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 156.lO(4) (i) (1999) (requiring warning label to be securely attached to the pesticide products immediate container); Andries v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 444 So. 2d 1180, 1183 (La. 1983) (upholding finding
that battery was adequately labeled where warning label was placed on
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Sara Lee v. Homasote

Following Goodbar and Higgins, Judge Black ruled in Sara Lee v.
Homasote 48 that the suppliers of bulk chemicals to an intermediate
manufacturer had no duty to convey direct warnings to users of the
manufacturer's finished product. In Sara Lee, the owner of a pickle
processing plant sued ARea and BASF, suppliers of a chemical raw
material known generically as expandable polystyrene beads ("EPS
beads") to an intermediate industrial purchaser. 149 The purchaser
fabricated the EPS beads into expanded polystyrene board insulation,
some of which was sold to a contractor who used it in construction of
the plant. 150 After a fire destroyed the plant, the owner alleged that
ARea and BASF were liable in negligence, warranty and strict liability
for failure to warn of the product's flammability.151
Judge Black described Goodbar and Higgins as "persuasive and controlling" of the failure-to-warn claims against ARea and BASF. 152 He
applied the factors in comment n of section 388, balancing the magnitude of the risks, the intermediary'S knowledge of the risks and the
ability of the bead suppliers to communicate with ultimate users. 153
Judge Black recognized that, although the potential product risks
were substantial, the suppliers' intermediate purchaser "was a knowledgeable industrial user of EPS beads," fully aware of its
flammability. 154
The evidence in Sara Lee demonstrated that the president and
owner of the intermediate purchaser was a pioneer in the EPS bead
industry, who had acquired extensive independent knowledge of the
product's flammability.155 Moreover, the suppliers had furnished to
their immediate customers "product literature concerning the flammability characteristics of EPS raw material and EPS board insulation,
as well as other important information on product uses and
applications."156
The court concluded that the intermediate purchaser was in the
superior position to communicate an effective warning to ultimate
users.157 Significantly, the beads were received by the intermediate
purchaser in bulk shipments of one thousand-pound containers that

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

product); Gillespie v. Century Products Co., 936 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. App.
1996) (asserting that label placed directly on product was a sufficient
means to convey the warning).
719 F. Supp. 417 (D. Md. 1989).
Id. at 419.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421-22.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 424.
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were later reprocessed and repackaged for distributing. I58 Consequently, ARCa and BASF could not have feasibly placed a warning on
the EPS beads that would have reached the ultimate users.I59 As a
result, the court analogized the difficulties encountered by the bulk
suppliers in warning the foundry employees in Goodbar to the
problems faced by ARCa and BASF.I60 The court also recognized
that "it would be difficult and unduly burdensome" for the suppliers
to identity, much less provide training to, all customers of products
containing the suppliers' EPS beads. I61
The plaintiff in Sara Lee argued that unlike the bulk suppliers in
Goodbar, ARCa and BASF actually had developed and directly marketed the technology for molding the EPS raw material to consumers.I62 The plaintiff contended that, "by virtue of this involvement,"
ARca and BASF incurred an obligation to directly warn consumers. I63 The court found this argument unpersuasive, however, stating
that:
[t] he focus of the bulk supplier/sophisticated user defense is
not on the knowledge of the raw material suppliers, but
rather on the knowledge of the industrial purchaser. The
record in this case establishes that Foam Industries knew or
should have known at least as much about the dangers of
EPS board insulation to the end user as ARCa and BASF. I64
Theoretically, strict liability should evaluate the product in its final
condition rather than the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in producing it. Nevertheless, the standard applied in strict liability warning cases, which evaluates the reasonableness of
manufacturer conduct, more closely resembles a negligence standard
by evaluating the reasonableness of manufacturer conduct. I65 Under
strict liability theory, inadequate warnings render a product defective
and unreasonably dangerous. I66 Under a negligence standard, however, if a seller's conduct is reasonable in framing the product's warnings, those warnings are considered "adequate."167
In the context of industrial products, any consideration of whether
a product safety warning is "adequate" must take into account both
distribution and workplace realities. From this perspective, the most
effective and, therefore, the most adequate warning that a manufac158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Kenneth M. Willner, Failures to Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74
VA. L. REv. 579, 582-83 (1988).
166. Id. at 58l.
167. Id. at 582 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt.j).
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turer can provide, will often be to the employer who will, in turn, incorporate the information into its training procedures.

IV.

ADOPTION OF THE SOPHISTICATED USER DEFENSE IN
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

The drafters of the Restatement (Second) recognized that under certain circumstances it would be impracticable for product suppliers to
effectively communicate warnings directly to users. In Restatement (Second) section 388 comment n, the drafters assert that a supplier of a
product may discharge its duty to provide an adequate warning by
providing information to a third person through whom the product is
supplied to the ultimate user.168 Comment n identifies the following
factors to determine whether a product supplier has relied reasonably
on an intermediary to convey warnings to ultimate product users:
(1) the dangerous condition of the product;
(2) the purpose for which the product is used;
(3) the form of any warnings given;
(4) the reliability of the third person as a conduit of necessary information about the product;
(5) the magnitude of the risk involved; and
(6) the burden imposed on the supplier by requiring that
he directly warn all users.169

A.

Workplace Warnings Liability

The considerations in comment n are particularly relevant when an
industrial customer purchases the initial manufacturer's product for
use in its own manufacturing process. 170 The increased impact of
warnings liability for injuries arising in the industrial setting has
caused two commentators to conclude that the "expansion of warnings liability has occurred with little consideration of what is known
about the communication and dissemination of information."171
Consequently, the extension of workplace warnings liability unguided
by practical considerations may result in two undesirable effects. 172
First, holding a manufacturer liable for failing to provide warnings to
employees of an intermediate purchaser has the unreasonable poten168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 388 cmt. n.
169. [d.
170. In an industrial setting, a written warning is generally not an effective
means of communicating safety information. Because of varying hazards
that may arise in different manufacturing processes, reduction of workplace injuries can only be accomplished through repeated safety instruction that is adapted to the particular workplace and process geared toward
the individual employees. This must be accompanied by enforcement of
appropriate safety rules. See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 40-43.
171. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 40.
172. [d. at 43.

364

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 30

tial of imposing absolute liability in those situations where it is impracticable for the manufacturer to warn the product user directly.I73
Second, the imposition of such liability upon manufacturers may lead
to an overuse of "legally sufficient, but practicably useless and even
counterproductive warnings" that will ultimately increase the occurrence of injuries in the workplace. I74
The principles of "communication theory"175 are applicable to the
particular problems that attend the transmission of warnings in industrial settings where manufacturers and end-users are separated by one
or more intermediate purchasers. I76 Applying the communication
theory, some commentators have outlined three broad requisites for
effective warnings. I77 Warnings must reach the intended audience,
must contain adequate admonitory and instructional information,
and must be understood by the intended audience. I78 Because" [t] he
ultimate objective of any product warning should be to reduce the risk
of injury associated with the product," the critical question must be
who can most effectively disseminate product safety information in a
manner that will actually protect the product users. I79 Considered
from this perspective, a manufacturer is frequently not the best provider of effective safety information to the employee using the product in an industrial setting.I80

1.

Manufacturer Inability to Identify Particular Hazards

For a product warning to be effective, it is essential that the provider "be able to identify the specific hazards which the product user
is likely to encounter."I8I Manufacturers of raw materials, bulk chemicals or industrial equipment are frequently unable to predict the risks
associated with the use of their products in another manufacturer's
process. I82
173. Id. (citing Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979), Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723 (N.H. 1976) and Schuh v. Fox
River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1974)). The Maryland Court of
Appeals has previously stated that the adoption of strict liability was not
intended to cast a seller of a product in the role of insurer or to impose
absolute liability on sellers for any injury arising from the use of a product.
Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976).
174. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 43-44.
175. Id. at 45. Communication theory is concerned with the description and
analysis of communication primarily through the use of models intended to
define the functional components of a "communication." Id.
176. Id. at 67.
177. See id. at 46.
178. See generally id. at 46-66 (noting that "[p]roduct warnings are a specialized
form of communication").
179. Id. at 51-52, 62.
180. Id. at 62.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Courts have held that where a manufacturer is unable to predict
specific hazards that the ultimate product user may encounter, it
should not be held liable for failure to warn. 183 For example, in Gonzalez v. Volvo of America,184 plaintiffs sustained injuries when their
Volvo station wagon overturned while pulling a V-Haul trailer. Plaintiffs argued that Volvo should have warned them of the risks of a mismatch of the trailer hitch and bumper. Because Volvo could not have
identified the specific risk of a mismatched trailer hitch, the court
ruled in favor of Volvo as a matter of law. 185 The court reasoned:
We acknowledge that Section 402A imposed upon Volvo a
duty to provide plaintiffs with a reasonably safe station
wagon. In our opinion, however, this duty did not extend to
a requirement to warn them that a particular trailer hitch
was unsafe to use, particularly when it was installed as appropriate by a company engaged in the business of renting trailers. The intervention of a professional such as V-Haul is the
rule and not the exception when consumers rent trailer
hitches. It was the duty of such professionals and not the
duty of defendant-appellant to select an appropriate hitch
for plaintiffs. Stated otherwise, the station wagon which defendant Volvo furnished to plaintiffs was not dangerous beyond the expectations of ordinary consumers. Ordinary
consumers consult trailer lessors such as V-Haul when renting trailer hitches, a necessary addition if the trailer is to be
utilized. It is the advice of such third parties and not the
warnings of automobile manufacturers upon which ordinary
consumers do, and should be entitled to rely.186
2.

Warnings from a Credible Source

Apart from identifying particular hazards, "the effectiveness of a
product warning depends in large part on the credibility of its
183.
184.
185.
186.

See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am., 752 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1985).
752 F.2d 295.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 300. As a general rule of products liability, under both negligence
and strict liability, a product manufacturer must warn product users or consumers of its product's dangers. Christopher P. Downs, Comment, Duty to
Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense in Products Liability Cases, 15 U. BALT.
L. REv. 276, 280 (1986). Often the product manufacturer can fulfill its duty
to warn by placing a warning on the product or by providing information in
the owner's manual or brochures delivered with the product. Nevertheless,
in some circumstances it is impossible or highly impracticable directly to
warn the ultimate product user. In these situations, product providers satisfy their warning duty through intermediaries who warn or instruct the
ultimate product user. See generally, Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intennediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of Intennediaries to
Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1185 (1996).
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source."187 An employer will generally have a close relationship and,
thus, more credibility with its employees than a remote manufacturer. 188 Furthermore, the warnings should be adapted to the individual needs of the intended receivers, including the employees in a
workplace setting. 189 Adapting the warning to individual needs would
be easier for the employer than for the manufacturer, as the employer
has a much better perspective to evaluate its employees' intelligence
and education, as well as their familiarity with the product and technical terms. 190
Because of its familiarity with the extent of its workers' education
and work experience, only the employer can provide and enforce the
appropriate levels of training required in the workplace. 191 Written
warnings from a remote manufacturer cannot provide the necessary
supervision and feedback required in an effective safety program. 192
Indeed, a remote product manufacturer is not even in a position to
determine whether its purchasers' employees are capable of comprehending complex technical warnings, or to respond to individual employee inquiries concerning specific technical information. 193 The
employer, "with the discipline inherent in the employment relationship," is in the unique position to implement and enforce appropriate
and effective training programs. 194 The employer's consistent workplace presence allows it to control that environment and compel adherence to safety rules adapted to the idiosyncratic use of the product
in its manufacturing process. 195

B.

Inappropriate Imposition of Absolute Liability

Written warnings provided by manufacturers and directed to users
of industrial products, unaccompanied by employee training programs, generally will not be effective in reducing product-related accidents in the workplace. 196 Holding manufacturers liable for injuries
they could not reasonably be expected to prevent is tantamount to the
187.
188.
189.
190.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 63.
/d.
Id.
Id. at 63-64. The commentators point out that "[t]wenty-five million people
in the United States cannot read at all. Another thirty-five million are functionally illiterate; millions of others read only in a language other than English." Id. at 64. Only the employer is in a position to assess the possibility
that illiteracy and other reading problems will render written warnings
meaningless to its employees. Id.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72.
/d. at 74. The obviousness of this principle has been recognized by the
regulatory scheme set forth in OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard.
29 C.F.R. §1910.1200.
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imposition of absolute liability.197 Such an approach flies in the face
of consistent pronouncements by courts that "strict liability is not a
radical departure from traditional tort concepts. Despite the use of
the term 'strict liability,' the seller is not an insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed on the seller for any injury resulting from the use of
his product."198
The imposition of absolute liability on product manufacturers for
failure to warn would have undesirable economic consequences. 199
The costs associated with absolute liability would be incorporated into
the costs of raw materials, component parts and, ultimately, finished
products. 20o Thus, society at every level would incur the cost "of workplace injuries which would be preventable under a properly focused
set of rules of warnings liability."201
Various commentators maintain that "the most effective solution to
workplace warnings problems is to require the employer to communicate safety information to its employees through training and supervision."202 This is particularly true given employers' statutory and
common-law duties to maintain a safe workplace, including maintenance of safe equipment, warning of any dangers in the workplace,
and training and supervision of their employees. 203 The employer
generally receives product safety information from the product manufacturer or acquires it through other sources. 204 The employer is in
the best position to know the dangers associated with the industrial
products it purchases and uses in its manufacturing process. 205
Therefore, the product manufacturer's duty to warn the employer
should be limited to those dangers the employer could not or should
not discover. 206
197. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 74.
198. Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955, 963
(1976); see also Miles Labs., Inc. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 717,556 A.2d 1107,
1113 (1989); accord Singleton v. Manitowoc, 727 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Md.
1989).
199. See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 74. Manufacturers who are held
absolutely liable have no incentive to warn unless the warning would reduce the number of accidents. Because warnings directed at users of industrial products generally are not effective in reducing accidents,
manufacturers are forced to pass the costs of workplace injuries on to society. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 79.
203. Id. at 79 n.183.
204. See, e.g., Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1167 (D.
Md. 1987) (noting that had employer not redistributed manufacturer's
product in unlabeled cans to its employers, they would not have been
injured).
205. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 79. This is important because industrial products have a variety of potential hazards associated with their particular use. Id. at 58.
206. Id. at 79.
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Such rules promote effective communication to insure that the
product user understands and appreciates the necessary safety information. 207 Thus, they are most likely "to accomplish the basic legal
objective underlying warnings liability-accident prevention."208
V.

THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

On May 20, 1997, the American Law Institute membership adopted
the "Proposed Final Draft," which is the latest and probably final version of the Restatement (Third), "subject to the usual editorial prerogatives.''209 The last half of the twentieth century will be remembered as
a technological revolution. 210 Products liability law seeks to compensate injured individuals through allocation of losses. 211 As Justice
Traynor explained in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherein it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market."212 Clearly,
technology is a "challenge to our outdated legal framework."213
The stated purpose of the Restatement (Third) was to reflect the current state of products liability law. 214 As the reporters Professors Henderson and Twerski stated as they embarked on their project:
[DJoctrinal developments in products liability have placed
such a heavy gloss on the original text of and comments to
section 402A as to render them anachronistic and at odds
with their currently discerned objectives. By changing the
relevant language to conform to current understandings-by
restating the Restatement-we hope to clarify much of the
confusion that has arisen over the years. 215
The Proposed Final Draft contained 386 pages of black letter law,
comments and reporters' notes. 216 It consists of twenty-one sec207. Id. at 83.
208. Id.; see also GENERAL LIABILITY AND CONSUMER LAw COMMITfEE, FAILURE TO
WARN: PRODUCT WARNINGS, INSTRUCTIONS & USER INFORMATION, ABA TIPS
PRODUCTS (1996).
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD).
210. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 429 (1993) ("[C]ivilization
is marching into the twenty-first century in a blaze of advancing
technology.") .
211. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 1, at 5-6.
212. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Ca. 1944).
213. Id. at 440.
214. Michael R. Maule, Comment, Applying Strict Products Liability to Computer
Software, 27 Tulsa LJ. 735, 756 (1992).
215. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1513
(1992); see also James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of
the Products Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 667 (1998).
216. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8.
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tions. 217 Sections 1 through 8 address liability for defects existing at
the time of sale. 218 Sections 9 through 11 concern post-sale obligations. 219 Sections 12 through 14 deal with successor and apparent
manufacturer liability.220 Finally, sections 15 through 21 address "provisions of general applicability," including causation, affirmative defenses, and definitions. 221
A.

Retention of the Product Defect Categories

Significantly, section 2 of the Restatement (Third) retains the categories of product defect that exist in current products liability jurisprudence: defective manufacture, defective design and defective warning
instruction. 222 Subsection (a) defines manufacturing defect as a "depart[ure] from its intended design."223 Subsection (b) defines defective design, stating that" [a] product ... is defective in design when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design ... and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe."224 The reasonable alternative design
requirement has proved to be extremely controversia1. 225 Subsection
(c) applies the same concept to warning and instructions defects. 226 A
product is defective when it omits risk avoidance or reduction information, the omission of which renders the product "not reasonably
safe."227
1.

Negligence-Based Design and Warning Defect

Comment a to section 2 establishes that the only liability standard
for manufacturing defects is "strict liability."228 The design and warning defect standards are negligence-based. 229 Significantly, the "consumer-expectation" test is eliminated as an independent standard for
217. See id.
218. Id. §§ 1-8. Sections 1 through 4 cover products generally, and sections 5
through 8 cover special products and product markets, including prescription drugs and medical devices. Id.
219. Id. §§ 9-11. These sections cover time of sale misrepresentations, post-sale
failure to warn and post-sale failure to recall product, respectively. Id.
220. Id. §§ 12-14.
221. Id. §§ 15-21. In particular sections 19 through 21 define "product," "one
who sells or otherwise distributes," and "harm to persons or property." Id.
222. Id. § 2.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. at Introduction; see also id. § 2 cmt. b (explaining that some courts
require the plaintiff to prove there is an alternative design available while
other courts use the consumer expectations test which directly contradicts
the alternative design requirement).
226. Id. § 2.
227. Id.
228. Id. § 2 cmt. a.
229. Id.
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determining defectiveness. 23o Instead, consumer expectation is relegated to the status of a mere non-dispositive factor for consideration
in risk-utility balancing. 231 As a logical consequence of this "demotion" of the consumer-expectation test, the obvious danger defense is
eliminated in defective design cases. 232
Under the Restatement (Third) negligence-based standard, warnings
and instructions must be reasonable. 233 Reasonableness is measured
by considering content, comprehensibility, manner of expression, and
characteristics of expected user groups.234 Instruction for the safe use
of the product must be clear and complete. 235 Further, if there are
unavoidable, material risks associated with the use of the product,
such risks must be disclosed adequately and completely so that the
user can make an informed choice whether to use the product. 236

B.

Retention of the Obvious Danger Rule

The Restatement (Third) retains the obvious danger rule in warning
defect cases, thus relieving the manufacturer of the duty to warn or
instruct of risks that are generally known to product users.237 On the
other hand, a product manufacturer or seller must provide warnings
for non-obvious risks that would be material to product users in deciding whether to use the product. 238 Such product warnings should be
provided to anyone "who a reasonable seller should know will be in a
position to reduce or avoid the risk of harm."239
C.

The Restatement (Third) on Learned Intermediaries

The Restatement (Third) insulates health product manufacturers
from liability if physicians do not provide product warnings to their
patients. 24o Under the Restatement (Third), section 8(d) (1), liability is
imposed on the manufacturer only if "reasonable instructions or
warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
medical device are not provided to prescribing and other health-care
providers who are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings."241 In mass vaccination cases,
however, comment e recognizes that health-care providers cannot
230. Id. § 2 ernt. g.
231. Id.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
[d.
241. [d.

§ 2 ernt. i.

§
§
§
§

2 ernt. j.
2 ernt. i.
2 ernt. h.
8(d)(1).

.

\
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warn patients, imposing a duty on the manufacturer to provide a direct warning to the patient. 242
The Restatement (Third) recognizes two other special situations.
First, direct patient warnings sometimes are required by statute or regulation. 243 Birth control pills and devices are examples. 244 Second,
drug manufacturers sometimes advertise directly to the public. 245 The
Restatement (Third) does not view these situations as exceptions to its
no warning rule. Instead, it provides that even if there is a duty to
warn patients directly, there remains the question of whether courts
should review the adequacy of these warnings. 246 The Restatement
(Third) leaves this issue to developing case law. 247
The question of whether the manufacturer may discharge the warnings obligation by warning a learned or sophisticated intermediary depends on what is reasonable under the factual circumstances. 248
Significantly, under section 2, comment i, the lack of warning of unavoidable risk is not a legal cause of injury if the product user would
have chosen to use the product anyway.249 Under comment j, no
warnings are required of generally known or obvious risks. 250 By contrast, the manufacturer must warn for foreseeable adverse allergic or
idiosyncratic reactions if a substantial number of users are susceptible
to the allergic reaction. 251
The impact of the Restatement (Third) on Maryland warnings cases
cannot be predicted with certainty. To some extent, the "revolutionary" work is still to come. The debates that occupied the American
Law Institute will be replayed in the states, including Maryland. Moreover, should Congress depart from its history and pass a uniform national products liability law, the Restatement (Third) will to some extent
become moot.
Plainly, the Restatement (Third) will not have as dramatic or "revolutionary" an influence as the Restatement (Second).252 Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) was not so much a statement of settled principles as it was a suggested new jurisprudence for states that did not
possess their own significant body of products liability
jurisprudence. 253
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. § 8 cmt. e.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 8 cmt. b.
See id. § 2 cmt. i.
Id. § 2 cmt. j.
Id. § 2 cmt. k.
Id. at xv (stating the Restatement (Second) provided a comprehensive engagement of the law of torts).
253. Id. (stating that, by 1990, the Restatement (Second) had been cited nearly 3000
times by courts).
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Today, many states have addressed the issues considered in the Restatement (Third).254 As a result, the degree of acceptance of the new
Restatement may be tempered by principles of stare decisis, or even legislative and judicial inertia. 255 Given Maryland's conservative attitude
towards products liability innovation,256 the courts and legislature may
not be receptive to rethinking basic, deeply embedded state law principles. As a result, defenses are likely to remain unchanged.
D.

Impact on the Bulk Supplier, Sophisticated User, and Learned Intermediary Doctrines

Two sections of the Restatement (Third) affect the bulk supplier, sophisticated user and learned intermediary doctrines: Sections 5 and 6.
Section 5 deals with liability of component-part sellers, while section 6
deals with liability for prescription drugs and medical devices.
1.

Section 5

Section 5 provides that the seller of a component part that is not
defective itself is not liable for harm caused by a product into which
the component was integrated unless the component seller substantially participates in integrating that component into the design of the
product. 257 Section 5 seems both fair and efficient. In most situations, the component-part seller cannot monitor how its component is
utilized by the end-product manufacturer. If liability were imposed
on the component-part manufacturer, it would have to achieve "sufficient sophistication to review the decisions of the business entities that
are already charged with the responsibility for the integrated
product."258
Section 5 was applied first in Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc.,259 a case
in which the defendant, a sheet metal fabricator manufactured a
quench tank according to specifications. 26o These specifications did
254. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., Inc., 202 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2000);
Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000); Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp.,
751 A.2d 518 (NJ. 2000); Lewis v. Samson, 992 P.2d 282 (N.M. Ct. App.
1999); Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1999).
255. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that
under the principal of legislative inertia, courts will leave laws undisturbed); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 890, 895 (10th Cir.
1994) ("Stare decisis is the policy of courts to adhere to precedent and not to
disturb a settled point of law."); Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318
(1965) ("UJudicial inertia ... results in the unauthorized assumption by an
agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress.").
256. RICHARD J. GILBERT & PAUL T. GILBERT, MARYLAND TORT LAw HANDBOOK
§ 12.0, at 138-39 (3d ed. 2000).
257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5.
258. Id. § 5 cmt. a.
259. 675 A.2d 620 (NJ. 1996).
260. Id. at 624.
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not require the fabricator to install safety devices. 261 The fabricator
was merely required to cut holes for such safety devices. 262 When the
tank was integrated into a regeneration system, the safety devices were
not installed. 263
The plaintiff argued that the fabricator had a non-delegable duty to
make certain that the quench tank was integrated into the regeneration system with the safety devices. 264 He further argued that the defendant must warn of the dangers of operating the quench tank
without safety devices. 265 Concluding that the quench tank was nondefective, the Zaza court reasoned that it was not feasible for the component-part manufacturer to attach safety devices to a quench tank. 266
The court also opined that it was not possible for such a sheet metal
fabricator to warn the product's end-user about the dangers of using
the product without such safety devices. 267
More recent decisions have applied section 5 as well. Component
manufacturers of teflon used in medical implants,268 silicone used in
breast implants,269 asbestos used in insulation,27o and a pulley integrated into a conveyor belt271 have all been absolved of liability.

2.

Section 6

Section 6 addresses manufacturer liability for defective prescription
drugs and medical devices. 272 Section 6(b) (2) imposes liability for defective drug design if the foreseeable risks of harm by the drug are
sufficiently greater than foreseeable therapeutic benefits. 273 As a result, if a class of patients exists for whom the drug is the reasonable
therapeutic choice, it cannot be defectively designed. At the same
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

271.

272.
273.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 630-32.
Id. at 634-35.
Kealoha v. DuPont Co., 82 F.3d 894, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
court does not cite the Restatement).
In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab., 996 F. Supp. III 0, lll4
(N.D. 1997); see also Artiglio v. Gen. Elec. Co., 61 Cal. App. 4th 830, 839
(1998).
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 334 (5th Cir. 1998). But see
Arena v. Owens-Corning Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 588 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (citing to section 5 but holding that raw asbestos is itself a defective
product rather than an innocuous component such as sand or gravel).
Buonnano v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 716 (R.1. 1999) (adopting
Restatement (Third) section 5); see also Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., Inc.,
202 F.3d 376, 379 (1st Cir. 2000) (relying on section 5 in interpreting Massachusetts law to find that the manufacturer of a customized dock lift,
which was a component of a material-handling system was not liable because the component itself was non-defective).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(a).
Id. § 6(b) (2).
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time, if a different FDA-approved drug is on the market that provides
comparable benefits with reduced harm or risk, presumably no reasonable health-care provider would prescribe the riskier drug. 274
Another aspect of Section 6 impacts the effect of the learned intermediary doctrine when drug manufacturers directly advertise their
drugs to the general public. Under the traditional learned intermediary rule, a drug manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn by warning the
physician, rather than the patient. 275 Nevertheless, sometimes patients should be directly warned. For example, if vaccines are administered without physician participation, courts have recognized an
obligation to warn patients themselves. 276
Difficult questions arise when drugs are directly advertised and marketed to consumers. Comment e of section 6 of the Restatement (Third)
recognizes that in such situations the learned intermediary rule probably should not insulate drug manufacturers from liability if the advertisements do not adequately inform patients of the risks posed by the
drug. The Restatement (Third), however, leaves to developing case law
whether to recognize an exception to the learned intermediary rule
for mass marketing of drugs. In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,277 the
New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the learned intermediary
doctrine should not relieve drug manufacturers of liability for commercially advertised products if consumers are not warned adequately
of drug risks.
E.

Impact oj the Restatement (Third)

The Restatement (Third) is most likely to affect cases of first impression. For example, if the adoption of comparative negligence is reconsidered, the Restatement (Third) view could be influentia1. 278 On
the other hand, if a state has entrenched case law or legislation, it may
ignore the Restatement (Third) views. 279 Significant controversy is likely
274. But see George W. Conk, Is there a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE LJ. 1087, 1102 (2000). The Reporters
of the Restatement (Third) "believe that Conk has misread Section 6(c) since,
if there was available on the market an FDA-approved drug that provides
the benefits of the drug in question with lesser medical risks, no reasonable
medical provider would prescribe the drug in question." James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability Restatement in the Courts: An
Initial Assessment, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 7, 26 & n.64 (2000).
275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(d) (1).
276. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v.
Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968).
277. 734 A.2d 1245 (NJ. 1999).
278. See, e.g., Webb v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343,348 (Vt. 1996)
(discussing the Restatement (Third) in considering whether to adopt comparative fault).
279. See Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Mont. 1997) (holding
state-of-the-art evidence irrelevant and inadmissible in a strict liability products claim despite recognition of the defense in the preliminary version of
the Restatement (Third) draft).

2001]

Failure to Warn Defenses in Maryland Law

375

to remain with regard to abandonment of the consumer-expectation
test and adoption of the reasonable alternative design requirement in
defective design cases. 280
The sophisticated user defense promotes an efficient communication system, encouraging manufacturers to provide adequate warnings
to immediate purchasers by placing the duty to warn ultimate users on
the party most likely to be aware of dangers and best able to warn. If
the policy goal is to prevent workplace injuries, the sophisticated user
and bulk supplier defenses should be accepted as consistent with case
law and reflective of industrial realities. The failure to adopt these
doctrines would result in the imposition of liability on manufacturers
for workplace injuries that only the sophisticated user or employer
could prevent, thereby elevating manufacturers to the status of insurers of product safety. Implementing these theories promotes appropriate standards for reasonable product safety.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The issuance of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
mandates a re-examination of Maryland products liability doctrine, including product-warning cases. In the warning arena, the related, but
distinct, defenses of the bulk supplier, sophisticated user, and learned
intermediary are central doctrines. 281
Product manufacturers and suppliers must be required to communicate safety information about their products to product users and
consumers. To be effective, this safety information may be conveyed
directly to end-users or it may be conveyed through intermediaries. 282
Warning through intermediaries is often less expensive and more effective than direct warnings.
The development of the bulk supplier, sophisticated user, and
learned intermediary defenses has clarified the obligations and rights
of manufacturers and end-users in the products liability arena. The
evolving case law and the Restatement (Third) are steps in the right direction as they encourage product manufacturers to place safer prod280. Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997)
(refusing to abandon the consumer-expectation test and to adopt the reasonable alternative design requirement). "[T] he fundamental tenet is that
a manufacturer should be allowed to rely upon certain knowledgeable individuals to whom it sells a product to convey to the ultimate users warnings
regarding any dangers associated with the product." TMJ Implants Prod.
Liab. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 1019, 1029 (D. Minn. 1995); see also Reiff v. Convergent Techs., 957 F. Supp. 573, 581-82 (D. NJ. 1997) (holding no duty to
warn about the physical manipulation inherent in the use of certain objects, such as computer keyboard repetitive stress injuries, which can cause
injury to some users).
28l. See supra Part II.D.
282. See supra Part II.D.3.
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ucts in the market. 283 An adequately warned customer makes more
informed product decisions. In the final analysis, the purpose of both
Maryland case law and the Restatement (Third) is identical-promotion
of appropriate standards for product safety through effective communication of product information.

283. See supra Part V.

